As high energy prices played a critical role in the recent U.S. midterm elections and in ongoing European political debates, Uzbekistan and Central Asia’s energy sector is also facing a perfect storm, partially of its own making.
Over the last two months, Uzbekistan has been approved to receive $300 million in loans from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to upgrade its energy system, bringing attention to the acute challenges facing the energy sector in the region. Three simultaneous crises have left Uzbekistan and Central Asia highly exposed.
First, Tashkent directly suffers from U.S. President Donald Trump’s war on Iran, which has disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and sent Brent crude over $100 a barrel. The countries best positioned to withstand such upheaval are those that are either net energy exporters, or those that have managed to diversify their energy production away from fossil fuels. This is unfortunately not the case for Uzbekistan.
A net energy exporter as recently as 2019, Uzbekistan’s net imports have now reached 28 percent and counting, as its gas fields decline drastically. Meanwhile, renewables supply just 19 percent of its electricity. The country has no current nuclear power despite significant uranium deposits, although it has plans to construct its first nuclear power plant within the next decade.
Second, Tashkent’s main energy partner, Russia, is also facing a severe crisis. Ukrainian strikes have strategically disrupted more than a quarter of Russian refining capacity, affecting gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. While the attacks have not halted pipeline gas deliveries for Uzbekistan, Russia supplied over a quarter of the country’s gasoline and the impact of the strikes led to record high pump prices across Uzbekistan in July this year. Sales of EVs represent merely 8 percent of the sales of new cars in the country, compared to 55 percent in nearby China.
The third crisis is purely of Tashkent’s own making and is the most critical for the future of the country: its inability to invest in and modernize its energy sector to decrease costs, increase output, enhance efficiency, and foster resilience. The culprit? “Shortcomings, bureaucracy and corruption,” as recently acknowledged by Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev himself.
Uzbekistan has gas reserves, but it has systemically underinvested in the sector, increasing slowly but surely its dependency on Russia. Domestic gas production fell an estimated 15 percent in the first quarter of 2026. This year, Tashkent expects its gas imports from Russia to increase by more than 40 percent. Electricity losses in Uzbekistan’s power grid reached an astonishing 17.2 percent, while losses in the natural gas network stood at 7.6 percent, far above international standards.
Uzbekistan’s energy infrastructure is old, crumbling, and inefficient, the result of decades of under investment. Mirziyoyev estimated that modernizing the country’s energy infrastructure will require $8 billion over the next decade. But investment will only flow if investors feel confident in the rule of law and protection of property rights, areas in which Tashkent has never excelled.
France’s EDF, Germany’s Siemens Energy, and Qatar’s Nebras Power would certainly not disagree. Under the aegis of the government, they joined forces to invest into the 1.2 billion euro Stone City Energy gas power plant project, before realizing that doing business in Uzbekistan was far from straightforward, and that a level playing field was hard to secure.
Over the last six months, they have faced an avalanche of surreal obstacles: the prosecutor general opened an investigation against the international consortium; the energy minister was dismissed and detained; following a legal complaint by the Uzbek oligarch Batyr Rakhimov, an Interpol Red Notice was issued and subsequently withdrawn against the local sponsor of the project, Kakhramonjon Olimov; and the gas field that was meant to supply the project was rendered inoperable by a series of blowouts.
Such confusion on all fronts is hardly what a global energy consortium would usually feel comfortable with. If Mirziyoyev is serious about attracting $8 billion in investment, a different treatment of international investors will be required. Weak rule of law raises investment costs and deters modernization. International investors need legal certainty and protection from political interference.
Uzbekistan cannot control the wars in Iran and Ukraine reshaping global energy markets, but it can control how exposed it is to them. Mirziyoyev has made the right diagnosis: the patient is in a critical state and requires urgent and massive investment. But doing so will require the country to conduct an in-depth overhaul of its governance and judicial practices to ensure full protection of property rights and effective implementation of the rule of law.
There are plenty of reasons to be optimistic about the future of Uzbekistan. But it must fix its governance and energy issues to realize its ambitions and potential.
