The year ahead in 2026 is an important period for China’s climate policy, amid hints that its emissions could peak and as the government publishes targets for the next five years.
Analysis for Carbon Brief shows the country’s emissions have been “flat or falling” for more than 18 months, but the timing of a peak remains uncertain.
In March 2026, the government is expected to publish a series of energy and climate targets for 2030 as part of its 15th five-year plan.
These targets could boost – or moderate – the pace of its energy transition.
A number of policy mechanisms that are already due to fully come into effect this year – such as non-binding total emissions targets and the expansion of carbon market coverage to more sectors – could also help decarbonise the country’s economy.
Meanwhile, the rise in extreme weather events intensified by human-caused climate change makes adaptation as important as ever, while also adding to the challenge of advancing clean energy.
Finally, as the US turns even further away from climate action and towards fossil-fuel expansion in 2026 – notably with Venezuelan oil – China’s climate diplomacy could send a strong signal for sustained global climate action.
Carbon Brief asked 11 leading experts on China what energy and climate developments they are watching for in 2026. Their responses have been edited for length and clarity.
Director of the China Climate Hub, Asia Society Policy Institute
After decades of the rapid growth that made China the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, independent analyses suggest China’s CO2 emissions may have plateaued or even begun to decline in 2025.
Strong growth in renewable power has, for the first time outside economic contraction, outpaced rising electricity demand, pushing power-sector emissions down and contributing to an overall modest drop in total carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. This latest trend was picked up by China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), as something that should continue over the next five years, marking an official nod to a peak in energy-related CO2 emissions years ahead of the 2030 timeline Beijing previously set.
The transition from emissions growth to stabilisation and early decline will be the key watch point for 2026 and will be shaped by the forthcoming 15th five-year plan. [This plan will set key economic goals, including energy and climate targets, for 2030.] Early policy signals suggest that the plan will introduce more explicit controls on total emissions alongside China’s traditional reliance on intensity-based targets.
However, the precise timing, scale and enforceability of these absolute emissions control measures remain under active debate. Chinese experts broadly agree that if the 2021-2025 period was characterised by continued emissions growth, and 2031-2035 is expected to deliver a clear decline, then 2026-2030 will serve as a critical “bridge” between the two.
The central questions are what this transitional period will look like in practice, how it will lay the groundwork for a sustained and timely emissions decline and whether meaningful reductions can be achieved before the end of the decade.
China team lead and researcher, Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air
In 2026, I’ll be closely watching whether China moves beyond high-level industrial decarbonisation targets and begins to address the domestic, structural constraints that have slowed progress so far.
In heavy industry, particularly steel, the main barriers are not technological readiness, but persistent blast furnace overcapacity and the lack of clear economic incentives for low-carbon production pathways, which continue to lock in emissions-intensive assets.
Against this backdrop, carbon-related trade measures, such as the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), will make 2026 an important test of how China balances export competitiveness with climate commitments. In addition, we will see whether growing international scrutiny accelerates more substantive demand-side and policy reform in industry, rather than prolonging a reliance on incremental efficiency gains.
Director and co-founder, Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress
Of course, I’ll be tracking all the critical energy and climate targets under the 15th five-year plan.
More importantly, I’m watching whether a coherent package of measures can truly take hold to unlock green electricity on the demand side – not just expand renewable capacity – and translate policy intent into a genuine market pull for renewable electricity, especially from the manufacturing sector.
Given the challenge of balancing rapidly growing electricity demand with the pace of grid decarbonisation, progress on this front will be decisive for the long-term trajectory of emissions.
I’m also watching how provincial and municipal governments translate the dual-carbon goals into concrete targets and sectoral implementation. Subnational action – through overarching dual-carbon plans and sector-specific measures – will be fundamental to achieving national objectives. It will be critical to ensure that the subnational momentum around zero-emission industrial parks and clean-tech manufacturing competition results in measurable, additional emissions reductions.
Energy Analyst for Asia, Ember
2026 marks the first year of China’s 15th five-year plan, the planning cycle that ends with China’s target year of 2030 for carbon peaking. China’s fossil-fuel use in power generation is seeing an early sign of peaking and the upcoming years will be crucial in driving the plateau into an absolute decline.
As renewables expand, system flexibility and stability will increasingly become the priorities. By 2027, China aims to retrofit its existing coal-power fleet “as much as possible” and deploy more than 180 gigawatts (GW) of battery energy storage. Development in coal retrofit and further policies to support battery development will both be important to watch in 2026.
On the other hand, maximising flexibility potential will rely on continued reforms in the power market and system operations, following the milestone year of 2025, which saw substantial policy development in China’s ambition to establish a unified national power market.
Principal analyst, ClearBlue Markets
In 2026, I am monitoring three pivotal developments in China.
First, the 15th five-year plan inaugurates the “dual control of carbon” system. This year marks the first time industries and local governments face binding caps on total emissions, not just intensity. Watching how these national constraints cascade down to the local level will be critical.
Second, the national carbon market is aggressively tightening. With the inclusion of steel, cement and aluminum this year, regulators are executing a “market reset” – de-weighting older [emissions] allowances and enforcing stricter benchmarks to bolster prices ahead of the EU CBAM’s full rollout.
Finally, expect a surge in zero-carbon industrial parks. Following the NDRC’s announcement of 52 pilot sites, new guidelines now mandate 60% on-site renewable consumption. These “green microgrids” are becoming the primary vehicle for reducing grid reliance and certifying low-carbon exports.
Senior China counsel, Institute for Governance and Sustainable Development
2026 marks China’s first year of advancing a comprehensive shift from “dual control” of energy consumption to “dual control” of carbon emissions. At the policy level, it will be essential to track how this transition strengthens the governance architecture for controlling non-CO2 greenhouse gases (GHGs), particularly methane.
Key developments to watch for may include efforts to strengthen measurement, monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) systems that enable facility- and company-level accountability.
It will also be essential to monitor progress on the voluntary GHG emission trading scheme, and the extent to which methane and other non-CO2 GHG controls are embedded in broader policy frameworks, including the environmental impact assessment system.
Finally, it will be critical to understand how non-CO2 GHG data collection and management requirements are incorporated into industry policy developments, including those addressing supply chains and product carbon-footprint initiatives.
Managing director, Sino Auto Insights
China’s electric vehicle (EV) industry has been the primary force pushing the global passenger vehicle market toward clean energy. Its domestic market has already crossed a more than 50% new-energy vehicle (NEV) retail take rate, while exports surged 86% year-on-year to around 2.4m units [in 2025]. That momentum should continue – especially as US legacy automakers pull back from EV investment in 2026.
As China’s domestic demand cools this year, export pressure will intensify. But a growing headwind has emerged: tariffs. Mexico, Brazil, Europe and the US are just a few of the countries raising barriers, complicating the next phase of global NEV expansion.
At the same time, 2026 looks like a prove-it year for next-generation battery technologies. Longer life, lower volatility and new chemistries could unlock more range, broader use cases and wider adoption – including in tougher markets like the US.
One new wildcard: the US now effectively controls Venezuelan oil. If that meaningfully impacts global oil prices, it could either slow – or unexpectedly accelerate – the shift toward clean-energy vehicles.
Climate and energy program manager, Greenovation Hub
In 2026, a key focus will be how China translates its 2035 “climate-adaptive society” goal into inclusive action. Finance for adaptation is a critical enabler, requiring both policy guidance and scalable financing models. As climate risks increase, financing resilience in sectors such as energy, transportation, infrastructure and public health is paramount. While China’s green finance taxonomy already includes some climate-adaptive activities, clear labeling and expanded coverage are important next steps.
Additionally, the global goal on adaptation (GGA) indicators can help measure project impact and inform policy. We have observed good practices already in motion, such as integrating meteorological technology with finance to enhance agricultural resilience.
Looking forward, expanding these innovative models to other sectors and regions is a key step, as these pilots can enhance policymaking and be replicated. In this process, identifying and managing risks for vulnerable groups, such as women and children, in public health and education is essential for an inclusive transition.
Practice professor of political science and director of China Programs and Strategic Initiatives, University of Pennsylvania
First and foremost, I’ll be looking for details on climate and energy targets in China’s next five-year plan cycle, which we expect to be approved as usual in March. This will essentially operationalise China’s recent nationally determined contribution and its longstanding commitment to peak emissions before 2030.
It will also give us a sign of the tempo we can expect for non-fossil energy capacity growth and whether China will be aiming for the high end of its stated emissions-reduction range. One area I’m especially focused on is the promised expansion of China’s emissions trading system.
Second, given my particular interest in and focus on geopolitics, I’m looking for signs of how the geopolitical disruption we’ve seen in Venezuela, Iran and other regions might affect China’s energy policy – in particular, in terms of long-term contracts for liquified natural gas.
Finally, I’m looking for signs of changes to China’s climate diplomacy following the US withdrawal from both the Paris Agreement and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. This leaves a big hole in global climate governance and many countries will be looking increasingly to China for leadership – and funding – in this area.
Senior policy advisor for industry and trade, ECCO
China’s solar manufacturing overcapacity is prompting Beijing’s first serious consolidation efforts. The government is introducing stricter licensing requirements and tighter energy-consumption caps for polysilicon facilities, while export-tax rebates for solar products will be abolished.
At the same time, China’s offshore wind technology is advancing rapidly. In early 2026, China installed the world’s first 20 megawatt (MW) offshore wind turbine and plans mass production of 50MW dual-rotor designs, with deployment expected from 2027-2028. MingYang’s £1.5bn announced investment in Scotland signals that Chinese wind companies are pursuing entry into European markets through local production, mirroring strategies adopted by battery manufacturers.
Together, these dynamics suggest that the next phase of cleantech competition will be shaped less by trade defense alone and more by the interaction between Chinese supply-side reforms and global market-absorption capacity.
Meanwhile, following a first wave of rare-earth restrictions in April 2025, Beijing announced controls in October that extended licensing requirements to additional rare earths and introduced unprecedented extraterritorial provisions. While China suspended the October controls for one year, the April controls on seven heavy rare earths remain fully operational.
This creates persistent procurement risk for European cleantech supply chains reliant on Chinese-processed rare earths, although China has begun issuing general export licenses, providing some operational predictability.
Senior lecturer in international development, University of Bath
The biggest question is obviously the emission peak, because it’s essential to confirm if China’s carbon and greenhouse gas emissions are actually flattening or even falling. I really hope China has already reached its peak and the net-zero transition is underway.
Another important area is the evolution of China’s cleantech industries, which have become a new pillar of the country’s economy in recent years. In 2026, it is critical to see if this momentum can be sustained in China.
Given fierce competition and the gradual saturation of the domestic market, I’m also watching how Chinese cleantech companies expand their global footprint through investments in overseas manufacturing, especially as a growing number of countries want Chinese investors to create more “green jobs” and transfer cutting-edge technologies.
